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EMPLOYMENT LAW-THE FAA'S EXEMPTION FROM
THE FLSA-MANDATED OVERTIME-PAY PROVISION
AFTER THE APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 1996
WENDY WILKINS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Abbey v. United States, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit vacated the ruling of the Court of Federal Claims that
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) violated the over-
time-pay provision of the Fair Labor and Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA).' The Federal Circuit held instead that, even though no
statute stated it, the FAA was still authorized to depart from the
FLSA's overtime-pay provision.2 The court interpreted both the
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act of 1996 (Appropriations Act) and Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996 (Reauthorization Act) together and
determined that Congress did not intend to discontinue the ex-
emption under which the FAA had operated.3 However, as the
dissent argued, this is too generous a reading of these statutes,
and the plain, unambiguous language of the Appropriations Act
does not allow for the interpretation given by the circuit court. 4
Therefore, the Federal Circuit should have upheld the Court of
Federal Claims's ruling.
The plaintiffs in this case-a group of air traffic control spe-
cialists and traffic-management coordinators employed by the
FAA (the controllers) -sued the United States alleging that the
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2016; B.S. Psychology,
University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg, 2012. The author would like to express
her sincere gratitude to her husband, Brandon, and to her parents, Sully and
Mary Schrampfer, for their constant love, support, and inspiration.
I Abbey v. United States, 745 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2014), reh'g en banc
denied (Aug. 22, 2014).
2 Id. at 1375-76.
3 Id. at 1375.
4 Id. at 1379 (O'Malley, J., dissenting in part).
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FAA violated the FLSA-mandated overtime-pay provision.5 The
FLSA requires that an employee who works more than forty
hours in a workweek must be paid at least one and one-half
times the employee's regular rate of pay.6 Since 1974, the FLSA
has applied to federal employees. 7 Tite 5 of the U.S. Code gov-
erns federal employment, and it lays out several exceptions to
the FLSA's overtime-pay provision, including the exception for
workers working irregular or occasional overtime.8 These work-
ers, if they request, may be provided "compensatory time"-
time off equal to the time spent in occasional overtime-instead
of the time-and-a-half rate of pay.9 In addition, employees who
work flexible schedules may be provided either compensatory
time or "credit hours"-hours used to reduce the length of a
workweek or workday.'0
The FAA, relying on these Title 5 exemptions, compensated
the controllers with compensatory time and credit hours instead
of time-and-a-half pay for several years." Congress then passed
the Appropriations Act, which reformed the FAA's operations in
order for the FAA to develop a new personnel management pol-
icy.12 The proposed purpose of the new personnel management
system was to ensure "greater flexibility in the hiring, training,
compensation, and location of personnel."' 3 The Appropria-
tions Act also stated that the provisions of Title 5 would not ap-
ply to the new personnel management system, except for a list
of specific sections that did not include the overtime-pay provi-
sion. 4 From this, the FAA implemented a new personnel man-
agement system that included maintaining the same overtime
compensation as it used before-compensatory time and credit
hours-having concluded that 49 U.S.C. § 4 0122(g) permitted
this.15 Shortly after the implementation of the new personnel
management system, Congress enacted the Reauthorization Act
of 1996, which stated that in fixing compensation of employees,
5 Id. at 1365.
6 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012).
7 Id. § 203(e)(2).
8 5 U.S.C. § 5543(a) (1) (2012).
9 Id.
10 5 U.S.C. §§ 6121 (4), 6122(a)(1).
11 Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1366.
12 49 U.S.C. § 4 0122(g) (2012).
13 Id. § 4 0122(g) (1).
14 Id. § 4 0122(g) (2) (A)- (1).
15 Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1366 (citing Abbey v. United States (Abbey Il), 106 Fed. C1.
254, 260 (2012)).
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the Administrator shall not "be bound by any requirement to
establish such compensation or benefits at particular levels."16
The FAA continued to provide, if an employee so requested,
compensatory time and credit hours to its employees who
worked overtime. These hours could accumulate with no expira-
tion. 17 However, in May 2007 the FAA changed its policy so that
the compensatory time earned before that date would expire by
May 14, 2010, and the government would discontinue its use of
credit hours altogether.18
Plaintiff controllers filed their four-count complaint on May 1,
2007, asserting, among other things not at issue on this appeal,
that the United States violated the FLSA by paying the control-
lers in compensatory time and credit hours instead of time-and-
a-half pay.'9 The United States moved to dismiss the count for
failure to state a claim (which the court treated as a motion for
summary judgment), and the controllers moved for summary
judgment.20 On July 31, 2008, the Court of Federal Claims held
that the FAA had no authority to depart from the FLSA's over-
time-pay provision and granted the controllers' motion for sum-
mary judgment on this count (Count II), while denying
summary judgment on the other three counts.21 On May 4,
2011, the Court of Federal Claims ruled on Counts I, III, and
IV-granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on Count I,
denying summary judgment on Count III, and granting sum-
mary judgment to plaintiffs on Count IV.2 2 Then, on June 12,
2012, the Federal Court of Claims held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to compensation due to the government's violation of
FLSA's overtime-pay requirement and awarded damages
accordingly. 23
The government appealed the ruling to the Federal Circuit, at
which time the government also changed its position on an-
other issue.24 Although the government had previously agreed
that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction under the
Tucker Act, it argued on appeal that a recent Supreme Court
16 49 U.S.C. § 106(0(1).
17 Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1367.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1367-68.
20 Id. at 1368 (citing Abbey v. United States (Abbey 1), 82 Fed. C1. 722, 728
(2008)).
21 Id. (citing Abbey , 82 Fed. C1. at 745).
22 Abbey v. United States (Abbey I), 99 Fed. C1. 430, 461 (2011).
23 Abbey III, 106 Fed. C1. 254, 287-88 (2012).
24 Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1369.
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decision (United States v. Bormes) overturned the longstanding
interpretation that the Tucker Act gave the court jurisdiction
over FLSA claims.25 The court decisively ruled against the gov-
ernment's argument regarding the Tucker Act and upheld the
Court of Federal Claims's jurisdiction.26 The court focused most
of its analysis on Count I1-the FLSA overtime-pay provision
question.
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RULING: FAA DOES NOT HAVE
TO PAY
The Federal Circuit held that the FAA was indeed still author-
ized to depart from the FLSA-mandated overtime-pay provision
when it created its new personnel management system.27 The
court took a two-step approach to analyzing the issue. First, the
court determined that no other authority outside of the author-
ity given under 5 U.S.C. §§ 5543 and 6120-6133 allows the FAA
to depart from the FLSA provision.28 Second, the court analyzed
49 U.S.C. § 40122(g) (1) "not in isolation, but in the context of
the statutes of which it was and is a part" and determined that
the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 5543 and 6120-6133, which previ-
ously authorized the FAA to depart from the FLSA-mandated
overtime provision, remained in place. 29 Therefore, the court
vacated the decision of the Court of Federal Claims, vacated the
damages award, and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings.3 In addition, the court held that the Court of Federal
Claims did not resolve the question of whether the FAA's chal-
lenged overtime-pay policies were fully or partially within the
FAA's exemption. 1
The first step of the court's analysis focused on whether any
statute other than 5 U.S.C. §§ 5543 and 6120-6133 afforded the
FAA the authority to depart from the FLSA overtime-pay provi-
sion. 2 Both the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit
held that the FAA could not depart from the FLSA's overtime
provision unless 5 U.S.C. §§ 5543 and 6120-6133 continued to
25 Id. (citing United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12 (2012)).
26 Id. at 1369-70.
27 Id. at 1375.
28 Id. at 1372.
29 Id. at 1374.
30 Id. at 1376.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1372.
280
CASE NOTE
authorize it.33 The government offered two other statutory pro-
visions for the purpose of proving the continuing authority: 29
U.S.C. § 204(f) and 49 U.S.C. § 40122(g) (1).3 4 The first provi-
sion, part of the FLSA itself, authorizes the Office of Personnel
Management to administer the provisions of the FLSA to indi-
viduals employed by the United States 5.3 The second provision
authorized the FAA to create a "personnel management system
that provides 'greater flexibility in . . . compensation.' ,36 The
court was clear that neither of these provisions, standing alone,
overrode the FLSA provision." In addition, the court analyzed
49 U.S.C. § 4 0122(g) (1) to determine if it met the high stan-
dards of an implied repeal of the FLSA's overtime-pay provision
and determined it did not.38 The court concluded that the legis-
lative history of § 40122(g) (1), if nothing else, was meant to
continue the availability of 5 U.S.C. §§ 5543 and 6120-6133 as
authority for the FAA. 9
Having concluded that 5 U.S.C. §§ 5543 and 6120-6133 were
the only provisions that could give the FAA the authority to de-
part from the FLSA's overtime-pay provision, the court, in its
second step, analyzed whether §§ 5543 and 6120-6133 survived
the Appropriations Act.40 In order to make this determination,
the court used one section of the Appropriations Act itself (49
U.S.C. §40122(g)(1)) for guidance.41 Section 40122(g)(1)
states that "not withstanding the provisions of title 5 and other
Federal personnel laws, the Administrator shall develop and im-
plement" a personnel management system, and that "[s]uch a
system shall, at a minimum, provide for greater flexibility in the
... compensation.., of personnel. '42 The court focused on the
two phrases "notwithstanding the provisions of title 5" and
"greater flexibility" in particular.4 3 The court explained that
"greater flexibility" must mean greater than the pre-Appropria-
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1373.
35 29 U.S.C. § 204(0 (2012).
36 Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1373 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 4 0 122(g) (2012)).
37 Id.
38 Id. (citing Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U.S. 799, 809-10 (2010)) (explaining both
that (1) an implied repeal is not favored and (2) will not be presumed unless the
intentions of the legislature to repeal are clear and manifest).
39 Id.
- Id. at 1373-74.
41 Id.
42 49 U.S.C. § 4 0122(g)(1) (2012).
43 Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1374.
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tions Act authority of the FAA.44 This greater flexibility language
coupled with the "notwithstanding title 5" language justified the
FAA's interpretation of the provision, according to the court's
rationale ."5
III. CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT: COURT HAS
JURISDICTION, BUT FAA VIOLATED FLSA
Circuit Judge O'Malley wrote an opinion concurring in the
majority's Tucker Act analysis and dissenting in its judgment on
the FAA's exemption from FLSA's overtime-pay requirement. 46
Judge O'Malley concurred with several of the majority's hold-
ings, namely: that under the FLSA, the FAA is an employer and
thereby bound by its provisions, that the FAA failed to offer an
express provision that exempts it from the overtime-pay provi-
sion, and that the Appropriations Act allows the FAA to adopt
and implement policies similar to those considered by Title 5,
even when the specific Title 5 policy is not enumerated in the
Appropriations Act. 47 The dissent's main contention is that the
FAA is not free to adopt a policy from a Tide 5 provision that is
an unenumerated section because this would violate the applica-
ble federal law.48
The dissent analyzed the statute from a strict interpretation
standard, contending that when Congress wants to make an ex-
emption from a statutory provision, it does so explicitly.49 In
fact, Judge O'Malley pointed out that the statute specifically did
exempt the personnel management system from the provisions
of Title 5, save the few exceptions laid out in 49 U.S.C.
§ 4 0122(g) (2); the overtime-pay provision was not one of these
exceptions.5" The dissent concluded that the language in
§ 4 0122(g) (2) is unambiguous, and therefore does not allow for
the administrator to create a reasonable gap filler because doing
so would be contrary to Congress's will.51 The dissent bolstered
its position by referencing the legislative history of the
- Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 1376.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1377 (citing Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005)) ("[The]
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.").
50 Id.
51 Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 (1992)).
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Reauthorization Act, which illustrated Congress's intention to
deliberately remove the personnel management system from Ti-
tle 5-and away from the overtime-pay exemption.52 Congress
was concerned that the FAA, in choosing its policies, would ig-
nore certain provisions of Title 5 that it deemed important. In
these talks, the overtime-pay provision was never mentioned,
while others were. 53
IV. ANALYSIS: CONGRESS DID NOT EXPECT THE FAA
TO HAVE TO READ ALL STATUTES IN ORDER
TO UNDERSTAND THE PROVISION
While it is reasonable that the court could read the several
statutes in their entirety and determine that the legislature in-
tended for the FAA to retain its exemption from the FLSA-man-
dated overtime provision, it is not, however, the clearest reading
of the provisions. The driving force behind the court's decision
is the reading of § 40122 (g) (1)'s language-specifically "not-
withstanding title 5" and "greater flexibility"-to mean that Con-
gress intended to leave in place the FAA's exemption from the
FLSA-mandated overtime pay provision. However, this rationale
is incomplete. The court reasoned that § 4 0122(g) (1)'s refer-
ence to "greater flexibility" must mean greater flexibility than
before the Appropriations Act, and eliminating the exemption
would necessarily decrease flexibility; therefore, Congress could
not have meant to take away the exemption.54 Read in isolation,
this conclusion could be understandable, but the court stops its
analysis before reading the very next provision, wherein Con-
gress enumerates the exact provisions of Title 5 that survive the
creation of the personnel management system. 55
The court, citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. as its authority, read 49 U.S.C. § 4 01 2 2 (g) (2)'s
directive that " [t] he provisions of tide 5 shall not apply" to mean
only the Title 5 provisions that constrain the new system, in con-
trast to those that empower the FAA.56 This analysis is a bit of a
stretch. Chevron says that if a statute explicitly leaves a gap for the
agency to fill, the gap-filler chosen will stand so long as it is not
52 Id. at 1378.
53 Id.
- Id. at 1374.
55 Id. at 1378.
56 Id. at 1374; Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843-44 (1984).
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arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.57 If
Congress leaves an implicit gap, then a reasonable construction
made by the administrator will stand.58 The court clearly found
this to be an implicit gap, with which the FAA would be permit-
ted to adopt a reasonable interpretation of the statute. 59 The
interpretation would be reasonable if one was only reading
§ 40122(g)(1); however, the language of § 40122(g) (2) is quite
clear. There is no ambiguity in the list of exceptions in
§ 40122 (g) (2). The overtime-pay provision is simply not listed as
a Title 5 provision from which the personnel management sys-
tem was exempted.6 ° With § 4 0122(g) (2) being a clear list of
exceptions to the Title 5 exemptions, the FAA should not be
allowed to add a gap-filler under Chevron because there is no
gap to fill.
The court's decision in Abbey could have widespread conse-
quences for two reasons. First, the decision could affect the avia-
tion industry by its effects on a key component in the industry-
air traffic controllers. In a way, the aviation industry revolves
around air traffic controllers: they ensure safety in the sky,
which helps commercial travellers feel safer, which increases
commercial travel, which bolsters the industry. Air traffic con-
trollers have one of the most stressful jobs in the United States.
The job requires total concentration at all times (and night,
weekend, and rotating shifts are the norm), creating a stressful
work environment that often leads to early retirement.6' Be-
cause the court felt that the statute was unclear and ambiguous,
the effect on the air traffic controllers' morale could, and per-
haps should, have been taken into consideration as a matter of
policy.
Second, much of governmental administration is conducted
via agency, and this decision will very likely make it easier for
federal agencies to interpret statutes more liberally and some-
times, as here, concoct interpretations that directly violate fed-
eral law. This decreases predictability and clarity for employees,
employers, administrators, and even courts. In Abbey, the statutes
that eliminated the FAA's exemption were clearly written and
57 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
5 Id. at 844.
59 Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1374.
60 49 U.S.C. § 40 1 22(g)(2) (2012).
61 BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUT-
LOOK HANDBOOK (2014), available at http://www.bls.gov/ooh/transportation-
and-material-moving/air-traffic-controllers.htm.
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unambiguous; however, the court has illustrated that even the
clearest of language will not bar agency gap-filling.
The Federal Circuit's decision, while understandable, is not
the clearest reading of the statutory provisions that govern the
FAA's ability to implement its new personnel management sys-
tem. Instead, the court should have upheld the ruling of the
Court of Federal Claims that the Appropriations Act removed
the exemption under which the FAA had previously operated,
and, consequently, the FAA was in violation of the FLSA over-
time-pay provision.62 The plain language of the Act states that
the "provisions of title 5 shall not apply" to the FAA-except for
the enumerated sections listed-meaning that the FAA is no
longer exempted from the FLSA-mandated overtime provi-
sion. 63 The court's decision will make it harder for administra-
tors to interpret directives when setting up their agency's
systems and may result in damages awards that may prove to be
costly for the government, and thus the taxpayer.
62 See Abbey, 745 F.3d at 1365.
63 49 U.S.C. § 4 0122(g) (2).
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